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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #01090-87

11 March 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Brig Gen Frank B. Horton III, USAF
Chairman

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with the Military Advisory Panel
on 13 March

1. You are scheduled to meet with the MAP on Friday, 13 March 1987, at 1600 hours in the 7E62 conference room. Panel members at that meeting will include Chairman Sy Weiss, [redacted] Paul Gorman, John Vogt, Ted Warner, Jasper Welch, and Richard Pipes. (This will be your first opportunity to welcome Dr. Pipes; he was absent when you last met with the group on 12 December.) Admiral Long will not be present. He plans to meet with the STAP on 13 March after spending 12 March with the MAP.

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2. A schedule of items on the MAP's March agenda is attached at Tab A along with a list of recent papers that will be provided to the Panel for background reading. The SOVA typescript [redacted] was included in the reading list in response to a request from Sy Weiss who learned about it last month at the Pentagon.

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3. Material is also attached on the 11/12 December MAP report:

- o Tab B -- the report
- o Tab C -- your questions on that report and NIO responses
- o Tab D -- NIO comments on other recommendations made by the MAP

4. Larry Gershwin will forward a separate memo to you concerning the question of MAP access to our response to NSDD tasking.

VIA
[Signature]
Frank B. Horton III

Attachments:
As stated



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11 March 1987

MILITARY ADVISORY PANEL

AGENDA

Thursday, 12 March

0900-0930	Executive Session		
0930-0945	Security Briefing by [redacted] CIA Security Education Division		25X1
0945-1015	Discussion of Estimates reviewed by the MAP on 11-12 December 1986: C/NIC BGen F.B. Horton III, USAF: VC/NIC Graham Fuller; Assistant NIO/GPF [redacted] NIO/East Asia Carl Ford; and NIO/SP Larry Gershwin		25X1
1015-1115	Discussion of IIM: [redacted] with NIO/AT LARGE MGen David Einsele, USA (Ret) and Assistant NIO/CBW [redacted]		25X1 25X1 25X1
1115-1230	Discussion of IIM: [redacted] with NIO/USSR Bob Blackwell and NIO/East Asia Carl Ford		25X1
1230-1330	Working Lunch		
1330-1430	Discussion of [redacted] with NIO/East Asia Carl Ford and NIO/WARNING John Bird		25X1
1430-1530	Discussion of [redacted] with Assistant NIO/SP [redacted]		25X1 25X1 25X1
1530-1700	Background reading		
1700	Adjourn		

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Friday, 13 March

0900-0930	Executive Session	
0930-1030	Discussion of <u>Soviet Economic Strains</u> with C/NIC BGen F.B. Horton III; VC/NIC Graham Fuller; NIO/Economics Deane Hoffmann; NIO/USSR Bob Blackwell; and NIO/SP Larry Gershwin	
1030-1130	Discussion of IIM: [REDACTED] with Assistant NIO/SP [REDACTED]	25X1 25X1
1130-1230	Working Lunch	
1230-1430	Discussion of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] with C/NIC BGen F.B. Horton, III; VC/NIC Graham Fuller; NIO/USSR Bob Blackwell, Assistant NIO/USSR [REDACTED] Assistant/NIO/USSR [REDACTED] NIO/Economics Deane Hoffmann; and NIO/SP Larry Gershwin	25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1
1430-1600	Executive Session	
1600-1700	Meeting with the Acting Director in Room 7E62.	
1700	Adjourn	


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11 March 1987

MILITARY ADVISORY PANEL

BACKGROUND READING, 12-13 MARCH 1987



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TAB B

MEMORANDUM FOR: ADCI

FROM: C/NIC

If you agree, I will distribute relevant portions of the attached MAP report to appropriate NIOs.

Yes. Also to
DDI + JACIS.
But send NIO for
response to MAP recommendations
in this area. I have some
notes coming to people on
this as well.
Rg.

Date 19 Dec 86

FORM 101 USE PREVIOUS
8-75 EDITIONS

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

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National Intelligence Council

NIC 05659-86
18 December 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Amb. Seymour Weiss
Chairman, Military Advisory Panel *Sw*

SUBJECT: Report of Military Advisory Panel (MAP)
Meetings of 11-12 December 1986

1. Introduction. The MAP reviewed eight areas of on-going NIC activity. (See Agenda Att A). As always, each effort is at a distinct stage in the Estimates process, i.e. some issues are at the early concept stage; some late in the NIC process. The comments which follow reflect this fact. Two other introductory comments:

- The MAP was impressed with the very high overall quality of the presentations. This is a tribute to the individual NIO capabilities and also gave evidence that the new NIC Chairman has already had a positive impact.
- One repeated MAP theme: the need for a broader focus of the intelligence products to make them more useable by policymakers.

2. Post-Reykjavik. The MAP devoted one-half day to this subject in recognition of its intrinsic importance. The Intelligence Community involvement, as we understand it, falls into two categories: a) support to the Executive Branch (in particular the JCS) in providing answers to the substantive assessments called for under NSDD 250 and b) the CIA/ACDA assessment of verification issues and requirements raised by NSDD 250:

a. IC Support of Substantive Analysis

- o It is above all important that the analysis be placed in a broad, meaningful, politico-military context. While there is a requirement for intelligence support of explicit military issues to be most helpful to the policymakers, the intelligence should provide a political frame of reference. What are the Soviets

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seeking or not seeking? What will be the impact on US allies and third countries? How will various NSDD 250 initiatives assist or impede US ability to conduct its foreign policy in time of peace? Are there significant economic implications to the Soviets should 250 initiatives be adopted? Etc.

- o Without attempting in this paper a detailed exposition of all the important political bases which should be touched, some of the areas the MAP discussed with the NIO's included:

-- Available intelligence would suggest a lack of Soviet seriousness about accepting the broader aspects of 250, e.g. zero ballistic missiles. It is even unclear how far they will go toward the 50% reduction. What is clear is that they will exploit to the hilt the political and propaganda opportunities: driving wedges within our own body politic; between us and our allies, etc. It is important that US policymakers understand this and moreover understand that portions of 250 are made to order for such Soviet exploitation.

-- Allied attitudes is a case in point. There is no way that our allies are likely to accept zero ballistic missiles within ten years, and for good reasons. Even the 50% reduction, for which there is greater support, has potential pitfalls, e.g. what happens to UK and French nuclear forces? How effective will NATO's nuclear deterrent be absent all or even 50% of the ballistic missile force? At a minimum, the IC ought to alert leadership of the costs of doing business as it was done at Reykavik, i.e. without full prior allied consultation.

-- With regard to the economic consequences of NSDD 250, there is no evidence that the reductions suggested will be viewed by the Soviets as a useful means to save resources. The amount of resources involved in Soviet ballistic missile programs, in relation to the Soviet defense budget, not to mention the Soviet GNP, is modest. Moreover, the best estimates are that what "savings" might be effected are almost certain to be redirected into other unconstrained Soviet military programs. Given the notion held by some, including some at high levels in our own government, that economic strains are forcing the Soviets to accommodate to tough US negotiating positions, it is important that the preceding point be made loud and clear.

-- The threat of nuclear power, of which Soviet ballistic missiles is the foremost ingredient, is viewed as essential by the Soviets as an implicit, if not explicit, means to intimidate the West. This is part and particle of Soviet

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Marxist-Leninist theory. The US view, at least in some quarters, that doing away with ballistic missiles is stabilizing, is not shared by the Soviets. Having a massive ballistic missile force is seen by the Soviets as in fact being stabilizing insofar as it conveys to others Soviet power and its coercive effect.

- Nor is it correct to typify Rejkavik as an historic breakthrough: the Soviets have embraced, ostensibly, sweeping arms control proposals from time immemorial. The Intelligence Community needs to set the record straight for the benefit of our own leadership. (An historical record of Soviet arms control proposals going back to Lenin might make interesting reading!)
- Finally, the IC can serve a useful purpose if it reminds US leadership that arms control can only be viewed meaningfully against the range of other US/USSR interactions. The President's "report card" -- which he announced at Geneva as being the basis upon which he would judge whether subsequent Soviet protestations of interest in arms control would be assessed -- should be revisited. Specifically, what has been the Soviet record on the four key issues raised by the President at Geneva as a precondition to moving forward with arms control? Alternatively, if the President abandons this linkage what impression is likely to be left on the Soviets as to how firm the President was and if judged not to be firm (on the linkage issue) what does this imply in the way of extracting further concessions from the US? (Incidentally, the President's strength in refusing to give on SDI is an important opposite side of the coin which surely deserves analysis in terms of the impression made on the Soviets.)
- o Moving to intelligence support to narrower military ramifications of 250, the MAP was left with the impression that adoption of the Zero Ballistic Missile (ZBM) proposal is being given far too much attention by analysts. The more likely movement -- if movement is likely at all -- is in the 50% reduction area. Moreover, militarily the MAP believe the analysis should address whether ZBM or even the 50% reduction would be militarily beneficial. (We have reservations on both but did not ourselves attempt a detailed analysis -- but see following comments.)
- Even absent Soviet cheating (see more on this below) a ZBM raises questions about the residual military capabilities on each side. One point of reference is the massive advantage the Soviets have in air defenses (against our remaining bombers and cruise missiles). If neither side has ballistic

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missiles, the ability of air breathing systems to penetrate becomes a critical factor. Another is whether reduced nuclear emphasis would not require increased conventional force buildup. If it does, what is its cost? Will allies go along with such a buildup? Another point: to argue that fitting out former US SLBMs with cruise missiles retains the high survivability of that leg of the triad may not be correct. Current SLBMs derive their invulnerability from the very long range of their ballistic missiles which permits a wide roaming of the oceans. Because of the short range of SLCMs, the subs would have to close to short range near hostile coasts and thus could become highly vulnerable. Indeed even the notion that doing away with BM's reduces the instability problem, because BM's are fast flying first strike weapons, may not be so clear as a military matter. The Soviets seem to have an active cruise missile program underway which might pose the West with the specter of Soviet supersonic cruise missiles, or stealth cruise missiles, either of which, fired from points relatively close to their targets, would give no more warning than ballistic missiles. The IC response to NSDD 250, especially in support of the JCS, needs to be sure such issues are examined.

- One of the major military areas of apparent illogic in NSDD 250 is the notion that SDI defense provides "insurance" against Soviet cheating. The commitment noted in NSDD 250 not to deploy SDI for 10 years, while ballistic missiles are reduced to zero, means that the "insurance" would, by definition, not be in place in time. A number of the MAP members support an early deployment of ballistic missile defenses and question the wisdom of the NSDD 250 ten year deployment moratorium. However even absent that moratorium it is not clear how much insurance can be secured within ten years from the go ahead on deployment. The MAP continues to believe that killing SDI remains a, if not the, highest priority Soviet arms control objective. The IC should reiterate this judgment, which it has earlier advanced, and warn that the Soviets could at some point decide to exploit offers already made by the US for a 10 year moratorium as a device to try and kill SDI. (Might the Soviets believe that if the US and USSR agreed to a 10 year moratorium that the Congress would not continue to fund SDI at a high level? Or that US leadership would find it difficult to break out of the de facto deployment?)

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- If, as suggested above, the current NIO focus is perhaps excessive on the ZBM proposal as compared to the 50% reduction, similarly, it appeared that too little attention was being devoted to the intelligence implication of the INF proposal. What does the IC think about the consequences of permitting INF forces in Eastern USSR targetted against US allies and US forces in the Far East? Would there be an expectation that the US would deploy offsetting forces to the Far East? If so, where and with what political consequences? Could the Soviets redeploy INF forces from the FE back to the Western USSR and if so what problems does this pose? What would be the political chances of the US reintroducing Pershings and GLCM's once removed from Western Europe (as required under the zero/zero INF proposal) should the Soviets redeploy permitted INF forces in Eastern USSR to the West?

The MAP believes the NIO's are on top of these issues and others. The uncertainty we have is how effectively the relevant IC politico-military views can be injected in substantive responses to NSDD 250 which will come from others and in particular the JCS. To the extent you have not already done so, exchanges at your level with the JCS and with the SecDef are called for. (Incidentally you are undoubtedly aware that there are differences in perspectives between at least some senior OSD personnel and the Chiefs; the former being more enthusiastic about NSDD 250 than the latter.)

b. The Verification Issue. Apparently the joint CIA/ACDA analysis is in a very early stage. In fact, the MAP was told that ACDA had proposed Terms of Reference which were unsatisfactory. (We did learn, independently, that ACDA was unaware that the TOR was considered unacceptable. Doubtless the CIA/ACDA staffs will be in communication on this issue soon.) We did not attempt to conduct a detailed investigation into the TOR. Nevertheless, we believe that a few flags can be raised for your consideration:

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- Some, in the IC, may be tempted to describe what can be verified with high confidence, implying the this is the preferred path to an arms control agreement. That was, in large measure, the philosophy which drove SALT II and which this Administration rejected. Thus, e.g., this Administration

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insisted that non-deployed forces, of which the Soviets are believed to have a not insignificant inventory, must be taken into account. What we know and do not know about non-deployed BM's and non-deployed warheads is important in the context of NSDD 250 and should not be glossed over. The implications of intelligence uncertainties about non-deployed systems obviously rise in proportion to the reduction proposed in controlled forces!

- It will not be possible for your staff to define intelligence assets which are required until the ACDA/CIA people agree to an approach to answering the verification problem. (This will be important to define carefully, however. We suspect the requirement may be costly and/or call for "cooperative" measures of a far reaching, perhaps politically unrealistic, nature.) Similarly, if the JCS, as expected, argue that major changes in strategy, doctrine and weapons systems are required if NSDD 250 were to be adopted, this too will (or could) have a major impact on intelligence collection and analysis needs. Your people do not have the JCS inputs as yet.
- It would be unfortunate if the CIA/ACDA response to verification ignored the problem of non-compliance. We have, after all, had extensive experience with Soviet cheating that we could verify. What does the IC believe is the Soviet attitude toward the US ability to enforce compliance? How does past experience affect Soviet willingness to accept the risks associated with being found in non-compliance? (It was argued in some quarters that the Soviets would never cheat, in a significant fashion, on the ABM Treaty because of the adverse consequences of being discovered. What does

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The MAP suggests that you may wish to consider early meetings with the Director of ACDA and with the JCS to discuss the verification issue. It may be a bit premature to do so, however, the verification aspect brooks so large in terms of what can or cannot be agreed to with what levels of confidence and with what assumptions -- financial and perhaps with regard to political practicality of cooperative measures -- about verification requirements, that erring on the side of an earlier rather than a later exchange of views at your level may be a prudent course.

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Arms Control Implications

a. We anticipate that we will be less capable in predicting future Soviet submarine developments.

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c. Although we don't see at this time rapid progress by the Soviets in developing and deploying long range land attack cruise missiles,

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Technology Transfer

The paper gives some excellent examples of the adverse consequences of technology transfer from the West.

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Net Assessment

It is the Panel's recommendation that because of the critical importance of submarine warfare in conventional war fighting, arms control, and nuclear deterrence, you should, together with Defense, conduct a broad net assessment of Soviet/US submarine warfare. This is likely to require a high level initiative on your part directly with the JCS. While the JCS may be reluctant to engage the DCI on the abstract issue of net assessments, here is a specific which they should find hard to turn aside.

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
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Beyond the foregoing the MAP had these specific reactions:

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5. [redacted] Hanoi and the POW/MIA Issue. The MAP was asked to review this

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a. We agree with the proposal that attention should be focussed on what direction Hanoi's policy is likely to take over the next several years and in particular its motives and purposes vis-a-vis the US. There seems to be wide agreement in the IC that a simple review of the question of whether there are or are not live American POW's being held by Hanoi is unlikely to be profitable.

b. Nevertheless, the POW issue cannot, and should not, be ignored in focussing on the broader issue of the probable direction of Hanoi's policy:

- The understandable emotionalism which surrounds the issue means it will not go away.
- Should the IIM leak, an apparent disregard of the POW issue would stand as an unforgiveable indictment.
- So long as separate studies, such as [REDACTED] suggest the possibility of live POW's no study on any aspect of North Vietnam can afford to ignore the issue.

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c. The MAP suggested several specific approaches in light of the foregoing:

- In analyzing the direction of North Vietnamese policy, the question can and ought to be posed, "Is it in Hanoi's interest to keep the issue alive or to settle it"? If it is to settle it, what should we expect as evidence of this fact, e.g. a willingness to permit unrestricted travel by US reps to suspected POW sites?
- The role of the USSR and the PRC in both the broader analysis of North Vietnamese policy objectives and the POW issue should be addressed.
- At the very least, the content [REDACTED] should be made available to the analysts working on this IIM. (Those who briefed us had not been given access to [REDACTED] including the DIA principal drafter.)

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A final point of generic interest: because DIA had originated the request for the IC analysis and because there was room for differences in approach, the NIO invited the senior DIA officer to sit in on our meeting. It was a useful innovation. In fact the MAP urges that consideration be given to using this technique more widely, i.e. that where the NIO has reason to believe that there are significant difference of view within the IC on a given issue, the MAP be exposed, directly, to those differences. You will recall that one of the several purposes you foresaw in establishing the MAP was that we serve to alert you to important issues and differences within the Community so that you not be "blindsided." The above approach would facilitate that objective.

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MILITARY ADVISORY PANEL

AGENDA

11 December 1986

0900-0930	Executive Session	
0930-1200	Community support to NSDD 250: <u>Post-Reykjavik Followup:</u> Discussions with C/NIC (BGen Barry Horton, USAF), NIO/SP (Larry Gershwin), A/NIO/SP [redacted] NIO/USSR (Fritz Ermarth), C/ACIS [redacted], D/SOVA (Doug MacEachin), and DD/ICS [redacted] and D/DDI/EURA [redacted]	25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1
1200-1330	Working Lunch Discussion of preparations for NIE [redacted] [redacted]	25X1 25X1
1330-1500	Discussion of Memorandum to Holders [redacted] [redacted]	25X1 25X1
1500-1700	Executive Session Review of recently completed estimates	
1700	Adjourn	

12 December 1986

0900-0915	Executive Session	
0915-1045	Discussion of IIM: <u>Hanoi and the POW/MIA Issue</u> with NIO/EA	
1045-1130	Discussion of [redacted] [redacted]	25X1 25X1
1130-1300	Working Lunch; Briefing on [redacted] [redacted]	25X1 25X1
1300-1400	<u>Soviet Initiatives in the Far East:</u> Discussions with NIO/EA (Carl Ford), NIO/NESA (Dan Webster), and NIO/USSR	
1400-1500	<u>Soviet Economic Strains:</u> Discussions with NIO/Economics (Deane Hoffmann) and NIO/USSR	
1500-1630	Executive Session	
1630-1730	Meeting with the DCI and DDCI in the DCI Conference Room	
1730	Adjourn	

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22 December 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, National Intelligence Council
Deputy Director for Intelligence
National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs
Director, Office of Soviet Analysis, DDI
National Intelligence Officer for the USSR
Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff

FROM: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: NSDD 250/Military Advisory Panel

1. The MAP has made a number of suggestions in terms of analytical emphasis growing out of the NSDD 250 exercise, including more attention to a 50 per cent reduction as opposed to preoccupation with zero ballistic missiles. I would like to have your recommendations on next steps, both in terms of analytical focus and contacts with the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on key issues we see arriving out of NSDD 250.

2. I would appreciate having your views by the end of the first week in January and suggest that Chairman, NIC take the lead in pulling this together.


Robert M. Gates

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22 December 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff

FROM: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: MAP Recommendations on Verification

1. The Military Advisory Panel has suggested an early meeting with the Director of ACDA and JCS to discuss verification issues. Do you believe this would be useful and what might the agenda of such a meeting look like? Please give me your views by the end of the first week in January.


Robert M. Gates

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3 March 1987

TALKING POINTS FOR MAP RECOMMENDATIONS

I. NSDD 250

A. We are in general agreement with most of the comments made by the MAP.

1. In fact, the draft, which the MAP did not see (they saw only a two-page summary), contained most of their recommendations. We added some material as a result of MAP suggestions.

a. In particular, we expanded our discussion of the 50 percent reduction regime, but not at the cost of refocusing the overall discussion, and we inserted into the Key Judgments material from the extensive discussions on Allied reactions that was in the body of the paper.

2. The DCI response to the tasking was forwarded to the National Security Advisor on 15 January.

B. We took exception to MAP suggestions that:

1. Greater emphasis be given to the 50% reduction proposals in this paper.

a. We added a couple of paragraphs on this subject.

b. We thought it unwise, however, to refocus the paper away from the zero ballistic missile proposal because that was the issue NSDD 250 was intended to address.

c. The Community is looking seriously at the 50% reduction proposals in other papers, and the subject will be addressed in NIE 11-3/8.

2. Policymakers be reminded of the President's "report card"--the four key issues he raised at Geneva as a precondition to moving forward on arms control.

a. This was clearly beyond the scope of the request made of the DCI and, therefore, inappropriate for the intelligence response.

C. The MAP also suggested that CIA hold early meetings with the D/ACDA and the JCS to discuss the verification issue.

1. In his memo forwarding the DCI response to NSDD 250 tasking to the National Security Advisor, the ADCI noted that "that portion of the tasking that dealt with verification matters and was assigned to Ken Adelman and the DCI jointly as well as the response to the question on the collection resources necessary for monitoring, will follow at a later date."

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